The heat of that July morning pressed down on the fields east of Atlanta, and Major General James B. McPherson was doing what he did best, riding his lines, reading the ground, trying to see what the enemy intended. All morning there had been reports, fragments, signs of movement that did not sit right. Confederate cavalry had been seen shifting toward the Union left.

McPherson, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, had spent the day inspecting his positions and warning his corps commanders to be ready. He was moving between units with only a small escort when a line of Confederate skirmishers rose up out of the woods in front of him. They called on him to surrender. McPherson, thirty-five years old, one of the most trusted officers in William Tecumseh Sherman’s command, refused, wheeled his horse, and was shot dead on the spot.

The Army of the Tennessee had just lost its commander at the very moment the Confederates were launching their most dangerous attack of the Atlanta campaign. The campaign that brought McPherson to that field had begun months earlier, in the spring of 1864, when the Civil War entered its most decisive phase. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant had launched coordinated offensives across multiple theaters, and in the West he gave Sherman the task of advancing into Georgia and seizing Atlanta, one of the Confederacy’s most vital manufacturing centers and railroad hubs.

Sherman commanded three armies, and among them the Army of the Tennessee under McPherson was his principal maneuver force. Time and again, McPherson’s men would execute wide turning movements that forced the Confederate general Joseph E. Johnston to abandon strong defensive positions rather than risk being cut off. Under McPherson served three corps commanders whose names would recur at every turning point of the campaign: Major General John A.

Logan, leading the Fifteenth Corps; Major General Grenville M. Dodge, commanding the Sixteenth; and Major General Francis P. Blair Jr. , at the head of the Seventeenth.

The campaign opened near Dalton, Georgia, where Johnston’s Army of Tennessee held formidable defenses along Rocky Face Ridge. Sherman understood that a frontal assault against that position would be costly and uncertain. Instead, he sent McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee through Snake Creek Gap toward the town of Resaca, hoping to threaten Johnston’s line of communications and force him out of Dalton. McPherson reached the area around Resaca successfully, but when he saw the Confederate defenses there, he judged them stronger than expected.

Rather than risk being isolated and destroyed, he withdrew. Critics would later argue that he had missed a chance to take Resaca outright, but his movement accomplished Sherman’s larger purpose. Johnston realized that his position at Dalton had become untenable and abandoned it. The opening maneuver established the pattern that would define much of the campaign.

Instead of destroying Confederate armies through direct attacks, Sherman and McPherson used maneuver to force them to retreat. The first major battle involving McPherson’s army came at Resaca on May 14 and 15. After withdrawing from Dalton, Johnston concentrated his forces around the town. McPherson’s troops attacked parts of the Confederate lines and probed for opportunities to cut Johnston’s route of retreat across the Oostanaula River.

Among McPherson’s subordinates, Dodge pushed his Sixteenth Corps hard across difficult terrain. Blair’s Seventeenth Corps supported the pressure on the Confederate defenses, while Logan’s Fifteenth Corps, one of the most experienced formations in the Union army, fought in the thick of it. The fighting was heavy and often confused, but McPherson’s men managed to threaten Johnston’s line of retreat. Recognizing the danger, Johnston pulled back again.

The battle had not destroyed the Confederate army, but it forced another retreat toward Atlanta. The result strengthened Sherman’s confidence in maneuver warfare and convinced Johnston that he would constantly have to give up ground to avoid being enveloped. After Resaca, the armies moved through northern Georgia in a series of marches and smaller engagements. Johnston tried to establish a defensive line at Cassville, but disagreements among his corps commanders and concerns about Union movements led him to withdraw once more.

Sherman then crossed the Etowah River and entered the rugged country west of Atlanta. Here the Army of the Tennessee became heavily engaged in fighting around New Hope Church, Dallas, and Pickett’s Mill. These battles arose because Johnston sought to slow Sherman’s advance through difficult terrain where large-scale maneuvers were far more challenging. The Army of the Tennessee frequently found itself at the forefront of efforts to probe and turn Confederate positions.

At the Battle of Dallas in late May, Logan, Dodge, and Blair all played significant roles once again as their corps maneuvered against entrenched Confederate forces. Logan’s Fifteenth Corps showed its usual aggressiveness while Dodge’s men pushed through tangled woods and broken ground. Blair’s corps helped maintain pressure on the Confederate positions and stiffen the Union lines. The fighting produced heavy casualties but no decisive breakthrough.

Yet the steady pressure exerted by McPherson’s army convinced Johnston that his flank remained vulnerable. These clashes revealed a recurring feature of the campaign: tactical stalemate at a given point often translated into operational success for Sherman, because the Confederates were being steadily forced to fall back. The Dallas fighting set the stage for the next phase of the campaign around Kennesaw Mountain. As the armies approached Kennesaw Mountain in June, Johnston occupied one of the strongest defensive positions of the war.

Sherman, frustrated by weeks of maneuvering, decided on June 27 to try a direct assault. Although the Army of the Tennessee was not the primary attacking force in every sector, McPherson’s troops were deeply involved in operations against the Confederate right flank. Dodge’s corps carried out offensive movements intended to exploit weaknesses in the enemy line. Logan’s corps helped maintain relentless pressure on the Confederate defenders, while Blair coordinated attacks and maneuvers that prevented Johnston from shifting his troops freely.

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain ended as a tactical victory for the Confederates, because the Union assaults failed to break their lines. But Sherman soon resumed his preferred strategy of maneuver, and Johnston was forced to retreat once more. The lesson of Kennesaw was that a strong defensive success was not enough to offset the Confederate inability to stop Sherman’s movements around their flanks. By July, the Union armies had crossed the Chattahoochee River and were approaching Atlanta itself.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis, increasingly dissatisfied with Johnston’s constant retreats, replaced him with General John Bell Hood, a commander known for aggressive offensive action. The change significantly altered the nature of the campaign. Instead of giving up ground to preserve his army, Hood sought opportunities to attack. The Army of the Tennessee under McPherson would soon become the target of one of the war’s most dramatic battles.

The Battle of Atlanta on July 22 began with Hood’s attempt to strike McPherson’s army from the flank and rear. Hood ordered Lieutenant General William Hardee to make a difficult night march around the Union left flank. Had the attack succeeded, it might have crushed the Army of the Tennessee and drastically changed the course of the campaign. McPherson spent the morning inspecting his lines and noted signs of Confederate movement.

While moving between positions, he unexpectedly encountered Confederate skirmishers and was killed when he refused their demand to surrender. His death stunned the army and deprived Sherman of one of his most trusted commanders. The burden of command now fell heavily on Logan, who took charge immediately on the battlefield. Logan’s energetic presence helped stabilize the Union line during one of the campaign’s fiercest battles.

Blair’s Seventeenth Corps endured severe fighting against Hardee’s assault and prevented the Confederates from achieving a decisive breakthrough. Dodge’s Sixteenth Corps played a crucial defensive role, especially around Bald Hill, where stubborn resistance repulsed the Confederate attacks. Logan personally led counterattacks, rallied troops, and inspired confidence at critical moments. By the end of the day, Hood’s attack had failed.

Confederate casualties were severe, while the Army of the Tennessee remained intact despite the loss of its commander. The Union victory at Atlanta preserved Sherman’s strategic position and denied Hood the chance to seize the initiative. Just as importantly, Logan’s performance demonstrated the resilience of McPherson’s army. After McPherson’s death, command of the Army of the Tennessee eventually went to Major General Oliver O.

Howard rather than Logan, a decision that disappointed many soldiers in the army. Logan nevertheless remained one of its most influential commanders. Hood soon launched another major offensive, leading to the Battle of Ezra Church on July 28. Sherman was trying to extend his line west of Atlanta and cut more of the city’s railroads when Hood ordered another frontal attack against Union positions.

The Army of the Tennessee, now under Howard and made up largely of McPherson’s veterans, occupied strong defensive positions. Logan’s Fifteenth Corps formed a large part of the line. Blair’s corps provided important support, while Dodge’s men reinforced threatened sectors. At Ezra Church, Hood repeated the mistake of attacking entrenched infantry.

Logan and his corps commanders moved quickly to fortify and organize fields of defensive fire. Blair helped secure the overall line and coordinate support between corps. Dodge’s troops contributed to the layered defense that absorbed the successive Confederate assaults. The result was a decisive defensive victory for the Union.

Confederate losses were heavy, and Hood’s offensive strength was further diminished. The failure at Ezra Church convinced many Confederate officers that violent attacks against entrenched Union forces were unsustainable. For Sherman, the battle confirmed that Hood was weakening his own army through costly assaults. Each failed attack reduced the Confederacy’s ability to defend Atlanta and increased the likelihood of Union success.

Throughout August, Sherman continued to extend his forces around Atlanta, looking for an opportunity to cut the remaining railroads supplying the city. McPherson’s former army played a central role in these operations. Logan, Blair, and Dodge directed corps-level operations that kept pressure on the Confederate defenses and protected Union maneuver forces. Their soldiers took part in a series of movements and engagements designed to stretch Hood’s army across a wider front.

The cumulative effect of months of campaigning was beginning to tell. Confederate manpower was dwindling, morale was suffering, and Atlanta’s connections to the rest of the South were becoming increasingly fragile. The final critical phase came with the movement against the railroads south of Atlanta, culminating in the Battle of Jonesboro. Although that engagement involved troops from Sherman’s entire command, the veterans of the Army of the Tennessee remained crucial participants.

The operation succeeded in cutting the Macon and Western Railroad, Atlanta’s last major supply line. Hood realized that the city could no longer be held and evacuated Atlanta on September 1. Union forces entered the city the next day. The capture of Atlanta was the culmination of a campaign that McPherson had helped shape from its earliest days.

The Atlanta campaign had consequences that reached far beyond Georgia. The fall of Atlanta gave a powerful boost to morale in the North at a time when war weariness threatened support for the conflict. It strengthened the chances of Abraham Lincoln’s reelection and undermined hopes for a negotiated peace that might have left the Confederacy independent. The capture of the city also opened the way for Sherman’s march to the sea, further weakening Confederate resources and morale.

From the opening maneuver at Snake Creek Gap to the cutting of the railroads at Atlanta, McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee played an indispensable role. Each battle built on the results of the one before it. Resaca led to Dallas. Dallas helped set the stage for Kennesaw.

Kennesaw preceded the advance on Atlanta. The Battle of Atlanta weakened Hood’s army just as Resaca had weakened Johnston’s, and the operations around Jonesboro made the evacuation of the city inevitable. Through that chain of events, the army McPherson had led helped achieve one of the most important Union victories of the Civil War and hastened the Confederacy’s final defeat.