On the evening of June 28, 1863, a scout rode into Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s camp with news that changed everything. The enemy had crossed the Potomac and was probably following the Confederate army. Longstreet sent the scout to General Robert E. Lee’s headquarters at once, carrying his recommendation that the scattered Confederate forces concentrate east of the mountains and prepare to meet the Federals.

The next day, orders came back. Longstreet was to shift a portion of his command and make camp at Greenwood. The bulk of his corps marched on the morning of June 30, leaving only Major General George Pickett’s division behind at Chambersburg to protect the rear. By roughly two in the afternoon, Longstreet’s two divisions and the reserve artillery had made camp at Greenwood.

He directed General John Bell Hood to place a brigade and a battery with Pickett at New Guilford, on the road toward Emmitsburg. The following day, July 1, the soldiers began their advance toward Gettysburg, except for Pickett’s division, still on guard at Chambersburg, and the substantial brigade Hood had left at New Guilford. The march was slowed considerably by Johnson’s division of the Second Corps, which entered the road from Shippensburg accompanied by a long wagon train. Even so, McLaws’s division reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, just after nightfall, and Hood’s division came within about the same distance of the town close to midnight.

During the day, Longstreet ordered Law’s brigade forward to rejoin its division. It arrived around noon on July 2. Before that happened, Longstreet received directions from the commanding general to maneuver his available troops so as to secure access to the Emmitsburg Road on the enemy’s left flank. The enemy had been driven back the day before by Lieutenant Generals Richard Ewell and A.

P. Hill and had taken up a formidable position stretching from Cemetery Hill along the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet was concerned that his force was not strong enough for an assault, so he resolved to wait until Law’s brigade rejoined its division. Once Law arrived and the troops were ready, the movement began.

Engineers sent out by both Longstreet and the commanding general led the column along a path that might have exposed their intentions. Delays followed while a more concealed route was sought. McLaws’s division took position opposite the enemy’s left around four in the afternoon, while Hood’s division moved farther to the right and partly enveloped the enemy’s left flank. The enemy’s original position along the Emmitsburg Road was not considerably stronger than those occupied by the two Confederate divisions.

The batteries opened fire. Hood’s division struck from the left, McLaws’s from the front, and the Federals were quickly compelled to fall back onto a steep hill that was arduous to climb because of its rugged ground. Numerous stone fences at its base made the position even more defensible. The enemy sheltered behind those fences and clung to them stubbornly as the Confederates drove them back step by step.

The fighting continued until nearly dusk, when a powerful enemy force met brigades from Major General Richard Anderson’s division, which was supporting Longstreet’s left flank. One brigade was forced to withdraw, and the support for another brigade was reduced, leaving Longstreet’s left side somewhat open and outflanked. Wofford’s brigade of McLaws’s division was also driven back at this time. Longstreet judged it prudent not to press further until the rest of his troops arrived.

The cost had been severe. General Hood received a serious wound soon after entering the fight and was forced to leave the field, causing delay in the Confederate operations. Brigadier General J. T.

Anderson of Hood’s division also suffered grave wounds and had to depart. In McLaws’s division, two brigade commanders were lost. General Barksdale was fatally wounded. General Semmes was badly injured and would later succumb to his wounds.

By this stage, Longstreet’s command held the ground taken on the right, while his left fell back to the enemy’s first position at Peach Orchard. During the day’s fighting, the Confederates had seized four artillery pieces and two regimental flags. The next morning, July 3, Longstreet prepared to resume the assault from the right, intending to flank around the hill the enemy held on their left. It would probably be a lengthy operation, he thought, but not excessively hard.

Shortly after he issued the orders for this scheme, the commanding general joined him and ordered instead that a column of attack be formed using Pickett’s division, Heth’s division, and part of Pender’s division. The charge was to be made straight against the enemy’s central position at Cemetery Hill. Longstreet had doubts. The distance to be crossed under enemy fire and in plain view seemed too great to promise major success, particularly since two thirds of the troops engaged in the charge had fought a difficult battle just two days earlier.

Only Pickett’s division was fresh. Still, orders were given. Major General Pickett was to form his line using whatever shelter he could find from the enemy’s batteries, making sure that the center of the attacking column would reach the salient point of the enemy’s position. Pickett’s line was to assault the enemy’s defenses directly, while General Pettigrew, commanding Heth’s division, advanced along the same line as Pickett simultaneously.

Pickett’s division was arranged with two brigades in front, supported by a third brigade behind them. Wilcox’s brigade was ordered to advance behind Pickett’s right flank to protect it from any enemy force that might attempt an attack. Heth’s division under Brigadier General Pettigrew was formed in two lines, supported by part of Major General Pender’s division under Major General Trimble. All the batteries of the First and Third Corps, along with some from the Second Corps, were placed to deliver effective fire on the point of attack and on the hill held by the enemy’s left.

Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of the First Corps, together with Colonel Alexander, had positioned the batteries and coordinated with artillery officers from the other corps on when to commence firing. Around two in the afternoon, General Pickett, who had been charged with organizing the lines behind the batteries, reported that the troops were ready and located on sheltered ground. Colonel Walton was then ordered to open fire. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries replied very effectively.

The guns on the hill at the enemy’s left were soon quieted. Those at Cemetery Hill, however, continued to resist fiercely. Many of their guns were driven off, but fresh ones rapidly replaced them as they entered action. Colonel Alexander was instructed to find an observation point where he could best see the effect of the Confederate fire and report the right moment to begin the charge.

After the batteries opened fire, Longstreet rode over to Major James Dearing’s battery. It seemed that the enemy was swiftly bringing in new batteries as others were driven off. Longstreet decided that the attack had to come very soon if anything was to be accomplished before nightfall. He ordered the batteries to refill their ammunition chests and prepare to follow the advance.

Then he learned that Colonel Alexander had already advised General Pickett that it was time for the attack. Longstreet gave Pickett the order to move forward. But there was a problem. The ammunition supply was so limited that the batteries could not reopen fire effectively.

The order for an attack, which Longstreet would not have supported under better conditions, would have been cancelled if he believed he had that option available. The advance was made impressively. All the troops kept their lines accurately while enduring fire from the enemy’s batteries with great calm and resolve. About halfway between the Confederate position and that of the enemy, a ravine provided some cover from the enemy fire, allowing a short stop for rest.

After a moment’s pause, the advance continued in good order. The enemy’s batteries soon opened fire with canister, and the Confederate left side wavered slightly under the heavy barrage. But the line kept moving forward steadily. Pickett’s troops did not appear deterred by the enemy fire and only halted briefly to return fire when they were close enough for musket range.

At the critical moment, Major General Anderson’s division was ordered forward to support the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. After delivering their fire against the enemy positions, Pickett’s troops charged forward. Then they broke ranks and retreated in great disorder. Far more men fell under enemy fire while withdrawing than had fallen during the initial assault.

The situation gave the enemy valuable time to concentrate their entire force against Pickett’s division, posing a strong risk of breaking his lines or destroying his troops before Anderson’s division could reach him in time. It also would have greatly exposed Anderson himself if he moved too far forward without support. Anderson was therefore ordered to halt his advance immediately. In a short time, the enemy, advancing against both flanks and the front of Pickett’s division, overwhelmed it and pushed it back, capturing about half of those who were not killed or wounded.

General Wright of Anderson’s division, along with all the officers, was ordered to regroup and gather the scattered troops behind Anderson’s division. Many of Longstreet’s staff officers were sent to assist. Anticipating an enemy attack, Longstreet rode to the front of the batteries to survey and oversee their operations. The enemy advanced forces at various times and from different points, but these were merely probing attacks that retreated as soon as the Confederate batteries opened fire on them.

These small advances and retreats continued until nightfall, when the enemy withdrew to their stronghold. Longstreet’s line was then pulled back to the Gettysburg Road on both the right and left, joining A. P. Hill’s right flank.

After dark, Longstreet received orders to make all necessary preparations for a retreat. The orders were given, and work began before dawn on July 4. On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from the line, and Longstreet’s command began marching, following A. P.

Hill’s lead. The march was significantly hindered by heavy rains and extremely poor roads. Still, they managed to reach the mountaintops early in the night of the 5th. On the 6th, Longstreet’s command moved toward Hagerstown, since the exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movement.

Longstreet felt unfortunate when he discovered that he could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve the trains at Williamsport, which were under serious threat from enemy forces. Arriving in Hagerstown around five in the afternoon, the column moved down the Sharpsburg Pike and set up camp about two miles from the town. Reports detailing the casualties of the campaign, including the killed, wounded, and missing, had already been forwarded for review. The battlefields of Gettysburg fell quiet.

The cannon fire faded into a haunting silence, leaving behind a landscape scarred by sacrifice and doubt. Longstreet’s narrative shows not only the tactical missteps and confusion of the Confederate commands, but also the questions that lingered after that decisive moment. The retreat to Hagerstown signaled a turning point. Yet it was only the start of a more profound struggle, one that would test the endurance of the Army of Northern Virginia and reshape its purpose.

In the shadows of victory, the Union celebrated while the Confederacy wrestled with its identity and future. The battlefield may have been quiet, but the questions raised by Longstreet’s account endured.